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PREFACE 
Water resource systems have been an important part of 
resources and environment related research at IIASA since its 
inception. As demands for water increase relative to supply, 
the intensity and efficiency of water resources management must 
be developed further. This in turn requires an increase in the 
degree of detail and sophistication of the analysis, including 
economic, social and environmental evaluation of water resources 
development alternatives aided by application of mathematical 
modelling techniques, to generate inputs for planning, design, 
and operational decisions. 
During the year of 1978 it was decided that parallel to the 
continuation of demand studies, an attempt would be made to in- 
tegrate the results of our studies on water demands with water 
supply considerations. This new task was named "Regional Water 
Management" (Task 1, Resources and Environment Area). 
Thispaper is oriented towards the application of systems 
analysis techniques to water management problems in Western ~kane, 
Sweden. These problems concern the allocation of scarce water and 
related land resources among several mutually conflicting users, 
e.g., municipal, industrial, agricultural and recreational water 
use. 
The paper is part of a collaborative study on water resources 
problems in Western ~kane, Sweden, between the Swedish Environmental 
Protection Board, the University of Lund and IIASA. The paper 
concerns a joint municipal water supply project. The viability 
of the project depends on how many municipalities will participate 
in it. Specif-ically addressed in this paper are methodological 
problems involved in allocating costs of the joint project to 
provide incentives for the participants. 
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ABSTRACT 
Methods for allocating the joint costs of a water supply 
facility among the different users are systematically compared 
using basic principles from game theory and fair division. It 
is shown that some of the more widely used methods, including 
the separable cost remaining benefit method, fail to satisfy 
some of these basic principles and that other lesser known 
methods appear to be more satisfactory. Application is made to 
a cost sharing problem among a group of Swedish municipalities 
developing a joint municipal water supply. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The water resources field has an extensive literature on 
the problem of how the costs of constructing and operating a 
joint facility, such as a multipurpose reservoir or common 
municipal water supply, should be shared among the different 
users.* There is also a significant literature in game theory 
that deals implicitly with this kind of problem, but only re- 
cently have these ideas been applied to the evaluation of water 
resource projects (Loehman and Whinston 1974, Suzuki and Nakayama 
1976, Bogardi and Szidarovsky 1976, Okada 1977). 
This paper examines some of the available methods from both 
sources in the context of a concrete example: a cost sharing 
problem among a group of municipalities in Sweden developing a 
joint municipal water supply. This example not only illustrates 
differences in the behavior of methods in practice, but suggests 
certain basic principles that methods should satisfy - based on 
considerations of equity, common sense, and the need to provide 
sufficient incentives for the participants to cooperate. This 
* See, for example, (Loughlin 1977) for a discussion of the 
literature. 
comparative analysis reveals that some of the more widely used 
cost allocation methods are suspect, while at least one lesser 
known method from the game theory literature appears to be con- 
siderably more satisfactory. 
This analysis of cost allocation procedures came .about as a part of 
a broader study of regional resource management problems focusing 
on southern Sweden. The root of the problem there appears to be 
a lack of established institutional procedures to resolve con- 
flicts over a resource which is in increasingly short supply. A 
particular but significant aspect of the problem is the lack of 
a really acceptable procedure for sharing joint costs. This 
problem is becoming of even greater importance now due to the 
formation of consortia of municipalities (e.g. the Sydvattencompany) 
whichareengaged in large scale, long-term water supply projects 
having sizable fixed investment costs. 
We begin with a general discussion of cost allocation methods 
and the formulation of some basic properties that these methods 
should satisfy. The methods are then applied to the Swedish cost 
data (beginning in Section 9) and the results used to compare the 
relative merits of the different approaches. From this comparison 
the conclusion emerges that one method seems particularly well 
suited to cost allocation problems of the type encountered in 
Sweden. 
2 .  JOINT COST FUNCTIONS 
The nature of the cost-sharing problem can be conveniently 
illustrated by a small hypothetical example. 
Consider three neighboring municipalities A,B, and C, who 
can either supply themselves with municipal water by building 
separate facilities or by building a joint facility. We suppose 
that the total cost of constructing a joint facility is cheaper 
due, in part, to economies of scale. We also assume that the 
water use is inelastic. 
Figure 1 
Region 3 Use per capita (m /yr.) 3 Unit cost($/m yr.) 
Table 1. Use Rates and Unit Costs for 3 Hypothetical Municipalities 
Figure 1 shows the populations of the municipalities, the 
targeted amounts of water to be supplied to each, and the cost 
of building separate facilities. Note that water use per capita 
varies between the municipalities, as does the unit cost of 
supplying water (Table 1). For present purposes it is assumed 
that water use is independent of price (a "requirement"); more 
realistic treatment would have to include demand as a function 
of price. 
Table 2 shows the costs of supplying the same amount by joint 
facilities. All possibilities are considered: e.g. A,E build a 
joint facility but C goes alone; B and C cooperate but A goes 
alone; A and C coperate but B goes alone. 
Table 2. Annual Costs of Supply iMillions of dollars). 
The cost figures say that building a facility to serve all 
three communities will save a total of 1.6 million dollars as 
compared with building separate facilities. However, A and B 
can also realize savings of $400,000 without including C, like- 
wise B and C can save $400,000 without including A. A and C, 
being geographically separated by B, cannot do any better by 
building a joint facility than they can by building separate 
facilities. Overall, the most cost-effective way of supplying 
water would be to build a joint facility serving all three com- 
munities . 
More generally, let E1,2, ..., n) = N represent a group of pro- 
spective participants in a cooperative venture to provide a service 
that is insensitive to price. The cost of serving a subgroup S, de- 
noted by c(S), is found by considering the least-cost alternative 
of providing the same service, either jointly or singly, to the 
members of S alone. The joint cost function c (S) so defined has the 
property that c (S) + c (T) - > c (S UT) for any two nonoverlapping groups S 
and T, because the ways of serving S together with T include the 
possibiliy of serving S alone and T alone. Thus, in the above 
example, municipalities A and C might find it quite costly to 
build a single joint facility because of their geographical 
separation; hence their least-cost alternative is to have two 
facilities: one for A and one for C. 
If the cost of serving any group of users is simply the sum 
of the costs of serving them singly, then the cost allocation 
problem is trivial. The more interesting (and typical) case is 
that the cost of serving several users by some joint facility is 
l e s s  than the sum of serving them singly, that is c CN) < C c'(i) . 
N 
To illustrate the different types of situations that can arise, 
suppose that the cost of serving a group S depends only on the 
number of members of S, and that there are cost savings from 
larger groups due to economies of scale. One possibility is to 
have constantly declining marginal costs as shown in Figure 2. 
Another and more typical situation is to have first declining and 
then rising marginal costs as in Figure 3. 
It will turn out that justifying a "fair" allocation of 
costs for the latter case is considerably more difficult than 
for the former (see Section 5). 
Total  c o s t  
70 
I 
1 I I I I - 1 2  3 4 5 6  7  Size  of c o a l i t i o n  
F i g u r e  2 
Total  cos t  t 
I 
I 1 I I I C 
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 Size  of c o a l i t i o n  
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3 .  PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION METHODS AND THE "RATIONALITY" PRINCIPLE 
One of  t h e  commonest c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  approaches  i s  t o  s imply  
d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  of  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o s t s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
g roups  o f  u s e r s  and a l l o c a t e  t h e  c o s t  of t h e  whole p r o j e c t  i n  
p r o p o r t i o n  t o  some g i v e n  c r i t e r i a ,  such a s  u s e  of f a c i l i t i e s  o r  
p o p u l a t i o n s .  T h i s  approach i s  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  s i n g l e  purpose  
than  t o  mu l t i pu r pose  p r o j e c t s  s i n c e ,  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  t h e  
n a t u r a l  u n i t s  i n  which t h e  d i f f e r e n t  u s e s  o r  purposes  a r e  ex- 
p r e s sed  may n o t  be comparable.  
The greatest advantage of the proportionality approach is 
realized when the proportionality criterion selected seems "fair", 
is easy to compute,and the accuracy of the numbers is not open 
to serious dispute. Compared with the prospect of evaluating 
alternative costs of all possible combinations of users - numbers 
whose accuracy may indeed be disputed - this approach seems 
quite practical. 
Set against this is the serious difficulty that costs al- 
located according to such a criterion may not provide adequate 
incentives for some potential users to participate. Nor should 
it be assumed -because the project analyst finds calculating 
alternative costs cumbersome - that this is beyond the capacity 
(or self-interest) of the users involved. 
In the municipality example above, an allocation of costs 
according to populations would result in the shares: 
But municipality A would find it hard to accept such an allocation, 
since it could provide the same amount of water on its own for only 
6.5 million dollars. 
An allocation according to use gives even worse results for A: 
The difficulty with "proportional" allocation methods is that 
they ignore a fundamental datum of the problem - the alternative 
costs embodied in the joint cost function c(S). In particular, a 
minimum requirement of a "fair" allocation is that no user should 
pay more in the joint venture than he would have to pay on his own. 
This principle, known as individunZ rutionaZity in the game theory 
literature (von Neumann and mrgenstern 1943, Nash 1950) is also well established 
in the project evaluation literature (U.S.Dept. of Agriculture 
1964, U.S. Dept.of the Interior 1953). This is a "fairness" idea 
since it means that no participant is penalized for'his parti- 
cipation. But if cooperation is voluntary, then as a practical 
matter it is also n e c e s s a r y  since it constitutes a minimum 
inducement to join. To be individually rational the costs 
allocated to A,B, and C in the above example must satisfy 
x < 6.5, xB 5 4.2, xC 2 1.5, where x +xgi xC = 10.6 millions A = - A 
of dollar-s. 
Similar arguments can be applied to g r o u p s  of participants 
as well as to individuals. Consider,for example, neighboring 
municipalities A and B: they can build a joint facility to 
service just the two of them for $10.3 million, hence it would 
certainly be unfair to allocate them more than $10.3 million in 
total costs. Not only would it be unfair, if cooperation is 
voluntary then with an allocation of xA +xB > 10.3, there is a 
risk of A and B backing out, since they can do better on their 
own. The condition that no group pay more than its alternative 
cost is known as the group  r a t i o n a l i t y  principle. Since a group 
may consist of a single participant, group rationality implies 
individual rationality. For the example above the cost allocations 
obeying group rationality form a subset of the set of all cost 
allocations xA,xB,x where xA,~BIxC 2 0 and xA+xB+xC = 10-6 C' - 
(see Figure 4 ) .  
In the general case, where therebare n independent users 
{1,2, ..., n) = N and alternative costs are given by the function 
c(S), the group rationality condition for a cost allocation 
x = (xl ,x2,.. . ,xn) is that 
.. 
(1 ) c Xi 2 c(S) for every subset S of N, 
S 
and 
C xi = c (N) . 
N 
4. MARGINAL COSTS 
A second way of approaching the cost allocation problem is to ask: 
what does an individual user contribute a t  t h e  margin?  Specifi- 
cally, if A,B, C are to share a joint facility, one may legiti- 
. mately ask how much it costs to serve A at the margin, that is, 
how much could be saved by leaving out A. In the example 
$10.6-$5.3=$5.3 million could be saved by building a joint 
facility that serves all but A. Therefore, if A is included 
it seems only fair that A should be assessed at l e a s t  $5.3 
million. This idea is well grounded in the project evaluation 
literature as a basic test of reasonableness (U.S. Dept. of 
Agriculture, 1964, and U.S. Dept. of Interior, 1959) and will be 
called here the i n d i v i d u a l  marg ina l  c o s t  p r i n c i p l e .  The marginal 
costs for A,B,C are shown in Table 3 .  
Table 3: Marginal Costs of 3 Municipalities ($10.6) 
There is an obvious extension of this idea to groups. For 
example, the marginal cost of including the group A,B is 
10.6 - 1.5 = 9.1. The marg ina l  c o s t  p r i n c i p l e  says that e v e r y  
c o l l e c t i o n  o f  u s e r s  s h o u l d  be charged a t  l e a s t  a s  much a s  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  o f  s e r v i n g  them.  This is only fair,since otherwise if the 
allocation were such that xA+xB< 9.1, then C would be s u b s i d i z i n g  ' 
A and B's participation. 
The idea of finding prices in which no users sub- 
sidize others in the use of a given public service or facility 
is well-known in the theory of public relation (Faulhaber 1 9 7 5 ) .  
Stated in general terms the marginality principle is that 
a cost allocation x - should satisfy 
(2) Exi 2 - c (N) - c (N-S) for all subsets S of N, 
S 
where 
5. THE CORE 
An inspection of the notions of group rationality (1) and 
marginality (2) reveals that in fact they are equivctlent, given 
the assumption that Lxi=c(N) (i.e. that all costs are allocated). 
The argument for group rationality rests on strategic consider- 
ations, i.e.providing sufficient incentive for users to cooperate, 
whereas marginality can be viewed as a general fairness concept 
that can be applied even if cooperation is mandated. The set of 
all allocations x,Lxi - = c(N), satisfying 11). (equivalently (2)) 
is called the core!* 
The core provides a guideline for cost allocation, but no 
more than that, since it narrows consideration to a class of 
allocations (as in Figure 4 )  without, typically, identifying 
a "unique" answer. Worse, however, is the possibility that 
there may be no core allocations; that is, no allocations that 
are either group rational or satisfy marginality. That this can 
happen in perfectly reasonable situations is seen from the example 
of Figure 3. Here there are increasing returns to scale but 
marginal costs are first declining, then rising. The minimum 
cost of serving all users is 49, but no matter how this is allocated 
* The cost function c(s), or more precisely - c(S), can be inter- 
preted as the characteristic function of a cooperative n-person 
game played by the prospective users. 
among the seven, some group of five must be assessed at least 
35 even though their alternative cost is lower (34). 
In such an example a quick test for the core is to draw a 
line from the origin to the point corresponding to the total 
number of users; this line segment must lie below the cost curve 
for the core to exist (Shapley and Shubik 1973). In more complicated 
examples the conditions (1) or (2) can be checked for feasibility 
using linear programming. In the three-municipality example, the 
core exists but is not large and if total costs had happened to be 
12.0 instead of 10.6 million it would be empty. 
No guarantee can be given that core allocations need exist for 
a particular problem; however, in general the greater the economies 
of scale, the more likely it is to exist. Even if the core does 
exist, it does not typically provide a unique answer. 
6. ALLOCATION METHODS EXTENDING THE CORE 
One approach to resolving these difficulties has been to 
look for some natural way of strengthening (or, as the case may 
be, relaxing) the inequalities (1) defining the core. This is 
the most common approach in the game theory literature. Three 
such approaches will be discussed; the least core(and nucleolus), 
the "proportional" least core, and theWweak"least core. 
The Least Core and Nucleolus 
If the core of the cost function c is empty this means that 
the best alternatives of some subgroups are very good - in a 
certain sense "too" good - relative to the best alternative of 
the whole group. Hence one could imagine imposing a tax on all 
proper subgroups as a way of encouraging the whole group to 
stick together. The "least core" is found by asking for the 
smallest uniform tax E such that if all coalitions other than 
the whole coalition are taxed by an amount E,  then a "core" 
allocation exists. Thus one finds the least E for which there 
exists an allocation x satisfying: 
- 
( 3  cxi - < c (s) + E 
S 
all S C N, 
and the l e a s t  c o r e  is the set of all allocations x satisfying 
-. 
(3) for this least E (Shapley and Shubik 1973). 
, 
Suppose on the other hand that the function c already has 
a core; then one way of narrowing down the choice of an allocation 
is to imagine s u b s i d i z i n g  all coalitions other than the whole 
coalition by a uniform amount E .  This amounts to solving (3) for 
smallest E and allowing E to go negative. 
Computing the least core involves solving a linear program. 
For the three-municipality example, this program (in millions of 
dollars) is: 
min E 
subject to xA- 16.5 + E ,  ~ ~ $ 4 . 2  +E, xcc 1.5 +E 
The answer is E = -.533, and the unique corresponding cost al- 
location is 
Normally (that is, except for "degenerate" cases) the linear 
program (3) produces a u n i q u e  cost allocation. If it has multiple 
solutions the following tie-breaking device may be- used: for any 
allocation x = (x,,...,xn) and coalition S define the e x c e s s  of 
- 
x on S to be E (S,X) = Cxi-c (S) . Let (XI be the largest 
-. * S - 
excess of any coalition relative to x, E (x) the next largest 
* 2 -  
excess and so forth. The nucZeoZus is a cost 3llocation x for 
- 
which 
( 4  E (X) ( (x) for all x (i.e. is a least core allocation) I - -  - -, -, 
(5 E~ (S) - 2 E* (x) - for all x -, satisfying (4), 
- 
(6) E~ (x) -, - c3 (x) - for all x - satisfying (4) and (5) , etc. 
It may be proved that there is only one such allocation x for a 
- 
given cost function c (Schmeidler, 1969). 
The Proportional Least Core 
This method is a variation of the least core that seems 
equally plausible, but has not to our knowledge been discussed 
in the literature on cost allocation. Instead of imposing a uni- 
form tax on project alternatives (or giving a uniform subsidy) 
make the tax or subsidy p r o p o r t i o n a l  to the cost of the alterna- 
tive. One finds the least tax rate r (per unit of costs) such 
that 
(7) Cxi ( - (1+r)c(S) for all S C  N 
S 
has a solution x (r negative corresponds to a subsidy). To assure 
- 
the existence of a minimum r assume that c(S) > 0 for all S. The 
set of all allocationsx optimizing (7) is the proportional least  core. 
-, 
For the three-municipality example the linear program is 
min r 
- 
< 1.5(l+r), < 4.2(l+r), xC =subject to x A  2 6.5(l+r), 
xg  
The s o l u t i o n  i s  r = - . I 0 2  (a s u b s i d y )  and t h e  un ique  c o s t  a l l o c a -  
t i o n  i s  
The Weak L e a s t  Core 
I n  t h i s  approach  one imagines  imposing a  un i fo rm t a x  on any 
i n d i v i d u a l  u s e r  who u n d e r t a k e s  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  whole 
group.  Thus one  f i n d s  t h e  leas t  E f o r  which a  s o l u t i o n  x  - e x i s t s  
t o  t h e  sys tem:  
(8) Lxi 5 - c ( S )  + f o r  a l l  S C N  , 
S  
The se t  o f  a l l  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a l l o c a t i o n s  x i s  t h e  v e a k  l e a s t  c o r e .  
- 
(For  a r b i t r a r y  E t h e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  (8 )  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  weak E c o r e ;  
s e e  (Shap ley  and Shubik  1 9 7 3 ) ) .  T h i s  method, w h i l e  s u p e r f i c i a l l y  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  l e a s t  c o r e ,  t u r n s  o u t  t o  have a  number o f  d e s i r a b l e  
p r o p e r t i e s  n o t  s h a r e d  by t h e  l e a s t  c o r e  o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  l e a s t  
c o r e  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  10)  . 
F o r  t h e  above example t h e  weak l e a s t  c o r e  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  from 
t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  l i n e a r  program 
min E 
< 4 . 2  + E , XC ( 1 . 5  + E , s u b j e c t  t o  xA 5 6 . 5  + E ,  xB = 
The solution is E : =  -.4, and the unique cost allocation in the 
weak least core is 
If desired, ties in either this method or the preceding could be 
resolved by a device analogous to that used for finding the 
nucleolus. 
Next we mention two other well-known cost allocation pro- 
cedures. 
7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
The Shapley value for n players is given by the formula 
(9) (s-1 ) . !  (n-s) ! x = C  i C '[c(S) - c(S-i)] 
s= 1 n! S:iES 
Is1 =s 
This is one of the earliest allocation methods to be based 
on a consistent set of postulates about how an allocation should 
behave (Shapley 1953). The idea is to think of all players as 
"signing up" in some order. If a group S has already signed up 
and i is the last to arrive, then his marginal  c o s t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t o  S is c(S) - C S -  The Shapley value is ins average marginal 
contribution if all orders for "signing up" are assumed to be 
equally likely. 
The Shapley value for municipalities A,B,C is calculated as 
follows. There are six possible orders for signing up, opposite 
each is the marginal contribution of each municipality for that 
order: 
ABC 
ACB 
BAC 
BC A 
CAB 
CBA 
Total 
Shapley Value 
=(1/6) totals 
8. THE SEPARABLE COST REMAINING BENEFIT METHOD 
The last method to be considered here is one that is commonly 
used in practice for evaluating multi-purpose water development 
projects. This method differs somewhat from the others, however, 
in that it requires a specific knowledge of benefits as well as 
costs. 
The SCRB method (Eckstein 1958, James and Lee 1971) begins 
with the assumption that the potential benefit of the contemplated 
service is known for each user, and that these benefits b(l), 
b(2), ..., b(n) can be estimated independentzy for each of the users. 
The so-called "justifiable cost" of the service to user i is the 
minimum of b (i) and i Is alternative cost, c (i) . 
What is known in this method as the "separable cost" is 
actually just the marginal cost, c' (i) = c (N) - c (N-i) , and the 
"nonseparable cost" is what remains from c(N) after separable 
costs are subtracted.* Thewremaining benefit" is the justifiable 
cost minus the marginal cost: r(i) = min(b(i) ,c(i)) - c' (i) .(If 
r(i)<O, the marginal cost of including i exceeds the justifiable 
cost and user i should not be included in the project). ~ssuming 
that r(i) 2 - 0 for all i the SCRB allocates costs according to the 
formula: 
(10) x = c' (i) +[r(i)/zr(i)][c(~) - Z c 1 ( - j ) ]  . i N N 
In order to apply this method to our example let us assume that 
each municipality's benefit from water supplied exceeds its 
"stand-alone" cost. From the marg'inal costs in Table 2 (Section 4) 
the remaining benefits for A,B,C are calculated to be: 
- - - - -  
* The term "non-separable costs" could be misleading since the 
sum of "seperable costs" may actually exceed the total project 
costs c(N), in which case "nonseparable costs" are negative and 
Xi is l e s s  than its marginal cost, cl(i). The possibility is 
shown by the example in Figure 3 (Section 2). 
Total = 4.0 
"Common costs" are 10.6 -(5.3 + 2.6 + . 3 )  = 2.4, so the SCRB 
allocation is 
Variations of the SCRB method include proposals for allocating 
the "nonseparable costs" in proportion to some criterion such as 
use, priority of use, population, etc. (James and Lee 1971). 
However, these variations have essentially the same advantages 
and disadvantages as this version. - 
Benefits constitute a feature of the SCRB method that does 
not occur in the description of the other methods. Fronthe stand- 
point of project justification, one wants to know whether the benefit 
from including another user or purpose in a project exceeds 
the marginal cost of including it. However, to estimate whether 
benefits e x c e e d  costs is quite a different matter than to justify 
a particular ZeveZ of benefits for inclusion in an allocation 
formula, since in practice, benefits are much more difficult to 
estimate reliably than are costs. Thus, in the application of the 
SCRB method to Sweden we simply assumed that benefits exceed stand- 
alone costs in order to avoid the conundrums involved in estimat- 
ing benefit levels explicitly. This feature of the SCRB consti- 
tutes one of its drawbacks in applications. The whole question 
of whether, in principle, it is b e n e f i t s  or c o s t s  that should be 
allocated is an interesting one that unfortunately is beyond the 
scope of this study; suffice is to say that there is no a p r i o r i  
reason why the answers should be the same. The practical problem 
remains that benefits are harder to estimate, and in the end what 
gets allocated c o n c r e t e Z y  is costs. 
9. APPLICATION TO SWEDEN 
The area of study consists of eighteen municipalities in 
the ~k%ne region of southern Sweden (Figure 5 ) .  At present most 
of the municipal water supply is drawn from three sources: local 
groundwater, and two separate pipeline systems which distribute 
water from two lakes Vombsjgn and ~in~sjen. 
As early as the 19401s, some municipalities in the area realised 
the possibility of shortages in local water sources and turned 
their attention to off-site sources. An association called the 
Sydvatten company was formed by several of them to plan for long- 
term water supply and management of the region. In the late 
19601s, this group (consisting presently of 12 of the munici- 
palities) began to design a major project to obtain water from 
a lake outside the region (Lake Bolmen) via an 80 km. tunnel. 
Recently, this project has been undergoing a period of recon- 
sideration and redesign as the actual increase in water demand 
over the past decade has turned out to be short of the original 
forecasts . 
The viability of the project depends on how many municipal- 
ities will participate in the project, and this in turn is 
dependent on how much they will be obliged to pay by participating 
in such a development vis-a-vis the availability and costs of 
developing their own on-site sources. In fact, the costs of the 
project in Southwest ~ksne has greatly escalated since the 
initiation of the project. This, together with more optimistic 
estimates of local resources and lower rates of demand growth, 
are some of the major factors that have led to a questioning 
of the project. The cost allocation problem is 
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one important aspect of a deeper planning problem in the region 
which can be ultimately attributed to a lack of established rules, 
procedures, and institutions that can effectively cope with 
changing planning environments and conflicts that emerge during the 
planning process. 
To illustrate how the basic concepts and methods developed in 
the preceding sections can be applied, the decade 1970-1980 was 
chosen as a recent planning period for which data and forecasts 
were available. The Sydvatten tunnel project mentioned earlier 
is not expected to have an impact until the 19801s, hence the 
alternatives considered for meeting incremental demands in the 
period are of a more conventional variety: extending the capacity 
of the pipeline system and increasing use of local groundwater 
sources where feasible. The year 1970 was taken as the "base" 
year and a water supply system was designed to satisfy the muni- 
cipal "requirements" for 1980 as they were forecast in 1970. The 
different cost allocation methods described above were then 
applied to examine the relative positions of the different 
municipalities. The results help qualify how the different 
methods work, and why some of them may be preferable to others in 
practice. 
Identifvinu Independent Actors 
The first problem in defining the cost function is to 
identify the independent actors in the system. To try to develop 
the costs for each of 218 - 1 = 262,143 possible groupings of 
the 18 municipalities is impractical and unrealistic. In 
reality there are natural groupings of municipalities based on 
past associations, geographical proximity, pre-existing water 
transmission systems, and hydrological and geographical condi- 
tions that determine the natural routes for water transmission 
networks. 
A careful study of these conditions led the grouping of the 
18 municipalities into six independent units as shown in Figure 
6. Group H for example consists of those municipalities already 
connected by the Ringsjdn water supply system by. 1970 together 
with the municipality of SvalBv, which would be located in the 
middle of the main transmission route. These groupings are treated 
as single units in the subsequent analysis of alternative costs, 
and will be referred to (somewhat loosely) as "municipalities", 
or sometimes "actors" or "players". The 1 9 7 0  populations and 
forecast incremental demands for these six municipalities are 
shown in Table 4. 
3 Populat ion (10  3 Municipal i ty  Incremental Demands (Mm /yr)  
A 8 5 . 0  
H 176 .3  
K 2 6 . 8  
L 69 .0  
M 287.3  
T 59 .5  
T o t a l s  703.7 
Table 4 .  Populat ions  and Incremental Demands for S i x  M u n i c i p a l i t i e s  
Ambiauities in Defininu the Co.st Function: Direct Costs 
In practice, ambiguities arise in defining the cost function 
due to the problem of distinguishing direct costs, that is, costs 
that would be incurred by a given municipality no matter what 
alternative action it pursued. For example, water distribution 
systems within municipalities are project components that are 
required whether the water is supplied jointly or separately. 
Therefore, the cost associated with it may be regarded as a direct 
cost. In principle, these costs could be excluded from the cost 
function on the grounds that they can be independently allocated. 
In practice, the borderline between direct and indirect costs 
is not always clear. In some municipalities, for instance, the 
water delivered by the regional supply network must first be 
pumped up to a reservoir before it is distributed further within 
the municipality, and facilities required for pumping depend on 
the pressureatthe end of the transmission network. So in fact, 
the costs of these distribution facilities are not independent 
of how the water is supplied. The definition of the cost function 
naturally depends on what part of these costs are treated as 
direct costs. 
Since some arbitrariness in defining the cost function al- 
ways exists in practice, it is desirable that the cost allocation 
method not be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of "direct 
costs". One of the difficulties with the proportional least core 
and SCRB as defined above is that they are sensitive in some cases 
to the inclusion of direct costs (see Note 2 in the Appendix). 
Calculating the Cost Function 
To avoid inconsistencies in defining the cost function, it 
will be assumed in this study that the pressure condition at each 
demand point is given irrespective of how the water is transmitted 
to that point. Then the cost of distributing the water within 
each municipality does not depend on the arrangement by which the 
water is supplied, and this cost element can be eliminated from 
the cost function as a "direct cost". 
The water delivered to municipalities is assumed to have the 
same quality level. The water taken from different sources is 
treated accordingly at the source and the costs of treatment are 
included in the cost function. 
Included in the water supply system are Vombsjdn and 
Ringsjbn , one major groundwater aquifer (Alnarp) and other 
minor on-site sources (see Figure 6). The possible routes ofthe 
water transmission network (based on a preliminary analysis) are 
shown in Figure 7. Also shown are the distances between each 
pair of points, the elevation of each junction or demand point 
(in parenthesis) and the incremental demand for each municipality 
(whose name is circled) up to 1980. 
A mathematical programming model may be used to determine 
the least-cost combination of the alternative supply sources for 
each coalition S. In the present case we assume that inherent 
economies of scale are such that all the incremental denands 
of a party will be met by the regional water supply system once 
they are connected to it.* Moreover, the assumption of the fixed 
* This, of course, does not mean all the parties shculd be connected to the 
regional systan. In general, there exists an optimal "degree of aggregation" 
which depends on types of facilities involved in a project. In this connec- 
tion, it is useful to distinguish between what may be called point facilities 
(eg. a reservoir) and distributed facilities (eg. water distribution network). 
'Ihe former usually exhibit mre significant econanies of scale, while for the 
latter type of facilities even scale diseconanies may be observed. O x  water 
supply system consists of both types of facilities. 
Figure 
Group 
-
6. Grouping of 1 8 municipalities 
Municipalities in the Group 
Xngelholm, Hoganis, Klippan, Rstorp, Bjuv 
Helsingborg, Landskrona, Svalov, Eslov 
Kivlinge, Lomma 
Lund 
Malmo, Burlov, Staffanstorp 
Trelleborg, Vellinge, Svedala 
-------- existing in 1970 
-1 (elevation) [m] 
fhnand point incremental 
- 
demand 1970-80 
3 [m Isec] 
.040 
Figure 7. Water transmission network 
pressure condition at each demand point allows us to treat each 
arc of the transmission network independently of the other parts. 
Thus, the cost-effective design of the network is carried out arc 
by arc. The water transmission cost for each arc of the least- 
cost design is derived in the Appendix (Note 1 ) and the results 
are given in Table 5. 
Transmission Cost 
Pipelines 
Pumps 
Electricity 
C1 = (350+477 D 1.60)~ Skr. 
C, = 39.2 QH x lo3 Skr. 
Treatment Cost 
Vombs jbn Capital Cost = 2.31 6.74 x 10 Skr. C~ 
0 /M cost 
Rings jon Capital Cost = 3.68 Q Skr. C~ -'64 x 10 
0 /M cost C~ = .410 6.64 x 10 Skr/yr. 
--.- . . 
Groundwater Capital cost 
C~ G =  2 . 3 8 ~ " ~  x lo6 Skr. 
0 /M cost 
Table 5. Cost functions for the water supply systems. 
The cost of treating water at Vombsjdn includes'the cost of 
infiltration, pumping and chlorination. The treatment at XingsjBn 
consists of screening, sedimentation, coagulation and filtration. 
Unfortunately, the particular cost data on these unit processes 
were not available for this study, so capital costs and total 
operation/maintenance costs were estimated based on available data. 
The costs of treating on-site groundwater including the costs of 
pumping, filtration and chlorination were estimated similarly. 
With these assumptions the alternative costs of each coalition 
can be evaluated. The results are summarized in Table 6 below. 
(Commas signify that the least cost option of that coalition is to 
break up into the subcoalitions indicated.) 
AHK 
AHL 
AH,M 
AHtT 
A,KL 
A,KM 
A,KT 
A I M  
AILIT 
A,MT 
HKL 
HKM 
HK,T 
HL,M 
HL,T 
H ,MT 
Kt LM 
KtLIT 
K,MT 
LMT 
AHKL 48.95 
AHKM 60.25 
AHK , T 62.72  
AHL,M 64.03 
AHL , T 65.20 
AHIMT 74.10 
A,K,LM 63.96 
A,K,L,T 70.72 
A, LMT 73.41  
HKL, M 48.07 
HKL,T 49.24 
HKMT 59 .35  
HLMT 64.41  
KLMT 56.61 
A,K,MT 72.27 
AHKLM 69.76 
AHKMT 77.42  
AHLMT 83.00  
AHKL, T 70.93 
AKLMT 73.97  
HKLMT 66.46 
AHKLMT 83.82 
Table 6. Joint Cost Characteristic function c(S) (Millions of 
Swedish Crowns) 
Discussion 
The cost function reveals the relative strength of the 
different actors, which depends on such factors as the cost and 
availability of local resources and access to others' resources. 
For example, L has a high unit cost of going alone but at the 
same time its location is advantageous, close to both regional 
sources. Municipality K is also favourably located. L and K 
have a strong incentive to participate indeveloping a regional 
water supply system, although L seems to be in a weaker position 
since it cannot do as well as K can by going alone. Municipalities 
A and T also have rather high unit costs, but their locations are 
unfavourable. As they have higher requirements for water than K 
or L, however, they may expect to take advantage of economies of 
scale by being connected to a regional supply system. The effect 
is bilateral, of course; other parties can also benefit from the 
parties A and T joining the system. 
Municipalities H and M have low unit costs, as they awn the hgsjeln 
and VambsjCln supply systems respectively. By including other munici- 
palities significant economies of scale can be realized and their 
own costs will be reduced. Between the two of them, however, exist 
differences in availablity of water and excess capacity of existing 
treatment facilities at Ringsjdn and Vombsjdn. This aspect is 
also reflected in the values of coalitions that include H or M. 
Compare, for instance, the coalitions HKL and KLM. The incremental 
cost of including municipalities K and L is much higher for the 
coalition KLM than for the coalition HKL since the treatment plant 
at Vombsjdn has to be expanded if K and L are connected to this 
sys tem : 
This implies that, in terms of savings, municipality H has more 
to offer K and L than M does. This will ultimately affect 
the costs allocated to each party by a strategic allocation method. 
10. COMPARISON OF METHODS 
Using the cost function developed above we now examine how 
the different methods described in the preceding sections compare 
in their cost allocations. The results are shown in Table 7 for 
two proportional schemes (by use and by population) and for the 
SCRB method, Shapley value, Nucleolus, Proportional Least Core, 
Figure 8 .  31un ic ipa l i t i e s1  share of t o t a l  c o s t s  
and Weak Least Core. The cost shares allocated by the seven 
methods are graphed in Figure 8 to facilitate comparisons. 
Method A H K L M T 
.. . 
ProportionaltoPopulation 10.13 21.00 3.19 8.22 34.22 7.07 
Proportional to Demand 13.33 16.32 7.43 7.00 29.04 10.69 
S.C.R.B. 19.54 13.28 5.62 10.90 16.66 17.82 
Shapley Value 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 
Nucleolus 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 18.60 19.21 
Proportional Least Core 19.81 12.57 4.35 9.25 19.85 17.99 
Weak Least Core 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 20.11 18.15 
Table 7. Cost Allocations of 83.82  Million Crowns by Seven Methods. 
Notice that the proportional allocations differ markedly from 
the others. In fact, a comparison of the proportional allocations 
with the individual actors' alternative costs (Table 8 )  reveals 
that these methods assign some participants in the joint project 
higher costs than they would have had to pay on their own. Allo- 
cation by population penalizes M for participating, while allocation 
by demand penalizes both H and M. 
A H K L M T 
IndividualAlternativeCosts 21.95 17.08 10.91 15.88 20.81 21.98 
Marginal Costs 17.36 9.85 .82 6.40 12.90 14.06 
Table 8. Individual and Marginal Costs for Swedish Example. 
This failure to satisfy the requirement of individual ration- 
ality derives from the fact that proportional methods do not take 
into account crucial differences among the participants in their 
access to sources of supply. The proportional procedures work 
against H and MI which are populous and in favour for example of 
the outlying regions A and T. However, in spite of their smaller 
populations, the inclusion of A and T is relatively costly because 
they are both remote from the major sources of supply (Vombsjdn 
and Ringsjdn). This fact is reflected in their high marginal 
costs (Table 8). whereas they should be charged at least the 
marginal costs of including them, both proportional methods fail to 
do so. These tendencies constitute a fatal drawback of the propor- 
tional methods. 
More seemingly reasonable, but almost as ill-behaved in fact, 
is the SCRB method. SCRB is individually rational, that is, does 
not assess an individual participant more than his alternative cost 
provided we assume that alternative costs are less than correspond- 
ing benefits (otherwise it may not even satisfy this Condition). 
But in general the SCRB method does not satisfy group rationality. 
That is, the SCRB allocation may not be in the core even when core 
allocations exist (as they do in this case). 
The three adjacent municipal groups H,K,L can provide 
municipal water for themselves at a cost of 27.26 million Swedish 
crowns, but the SCRB method would assess them 29.81 million crowns 
if they shared in a regional facility. With such an assessment 
it would not be in this group's interest to participate. Put 
another way, if H,K,L are assessed these amounts then they are, 
in effect, being forced to s u b s i d i z e  the others' water supply 
costs. Since there exist other assessments in which no group sub- 
sidizes another, such an allocation must be branded as inequitable. 
That the SCRB suffers from this defect is not surprising, 
since it only considers the marginal costs of including i n d i v i d u a l  
participants, not the marginal cost of groups. In this case, 
the marginal cost of including both M and  T is much higher than 
the sum of their individual marginal costs (since if one is served, 
the a d d i t i o n a l  expense of serving the other is low) but the SCRB 
method fails to pick up this fact. In sum, while fewer cost 
elements need be estimated in order to calculate the SCRB allo- 
cation, this short-cut has a price: it may result in a less 
equitable allocation overall. 
By contrast, the Shapley value requires knowing the alter- 
native costs for all subsets. Unfortunately, however, it also 
fails the group rationality (alternatively, the marginality 
test) in this case on the same coalition H , K . L .  The Shapley 
value would assess this coalition 440,000 crowns more than their 
alternative cost. 
Since the core idea seems essential from both the standpoint 
of equity and of providing sufficient incentives to cooperate, 
the remaining three methods - the nucleolus, weak least core, and 
proportional least core - seem potentially to be the most desirable. 
They always produce a core allocation if one exists, and it may 
be checked that all three allocations in the Swedish case satisfy 
the core conditions. Moreover, there seems to be little difference 
between the results they give. One might be tempted to say that 
therefore it does not matter which is used. 
But we are analyzing the behavior of methodsfnot solutions 
to one problem only. m he question is, how do the methods compare 
over different problems - do they always give similar results? 
By considering variations in the problem data some crucial differ- 
ences between these methods come to light. 
~ypically in a construction project costs cannot be known in 
advance with certainty. Rather, the project must be undertaken based 
on some "best estimate" of total costs anG 'he costs of alternatives. 
Assuming that the project represented by the whole group is under- 
taken, the true level of total costs c(N) will be revealed once 
the project is completed, but the estimated costs of alternatives 
will remain as before (assuming that no better information on the 
alternatives has been gained). 
Therefore,in practice an agreement on how to allocate 'costs 
must involve an agreement on how to allocate different levels of 
C 
costs C(S) for all S +N. It is essential that a method should 
behave reasonably for different levels of costs; in particular, if 
costs turn out to be higher than expected then no participant's. 
allocation should go down, and vice versa. Such a method is said 
to be monotone (Megiddo, 1974). Monotonicity seems to be essential 
for any "fair" allocation procedure in which the total amount to be 
allocated is variable or uncertain. This property has also played 
a key role in discrete allocation or "apportionment" problems 
(Huntington 1928, Balinski and Young 1974, 1975, 1979a, 1979b). 
Unfortunately, not all of the methods considered above are 
monotone. In the Swedish example, suppose that the costs of a 
regional facility are discovered to involve unforeseen additional 
costs of 4 million crowns so that now total costs are 87.82 in- 
stead of 83.82, all alternative costs remaining the same as before. 
Comparing the new allocations with the old (Table 9), we 
notice that the nucleolus assesses both K and T Less even though 
the total cost of the project has increased. Similarly, under 
SCRB, K's assessment would be 150,000 crowns less in a more costly 
project. This nonmonotone behavior casts grave doubt on the 
nucleolus and SCRB as reasonable cost allocation procedures. 
A H K L M T Total 
Proportional to demand 13.96 17.10 7.97 7.33 30.42 11.20 87.82 
'13.33 16.32 7.43 7.00 29.04 10.69 83.82 
Shapley Value . 20.67 11.38 7.29 11.03 17.60 19.84 87.82 
'20.01 10.71 6:61 10.37 16.94 19.18 83.82 
Nucleolus 
Weak Least Core 
Table 9. Allocations Under Increased Costs (Millions of Crowns). 
On the other hand, it is easy to verify that the proportional 
allocation methods and the Shapley value are always monotone. So 
also is the weak least core, since the way the weak least core 
operates under a change in total costs is to allocate the change 
equally among the players (Note 3). The proportional least core, 
on the other handtoperates by allocating the change in costs in 
proportion to the players' previous assessments (Note 4). This 
feature of the proportional least core seems rather reasonable - 
provided the cost changes are relatively small, and that every 
player was assessed costs before the change. 
But there are also perfectly natural examples where certain 
players can reasonably expect to be paid to cooperate (rather than 
pay) and for these examples the proportional least core does not 
seem so reasonable. In fact, it is not monotone (See Note 5). 
12. CONCLUSION 
Given the practical need to allocate costs when there are 
different users of a joint water resource facility, the problem 
is how to choose rationally among the many different available 
methods. 
Tnitself, the use of a definite computational procedure 
gives some semblance of rationality. However, the justification 
of a method does not lie in the computational procedure it er;lploys, 
but rather in its behavior in practice. Hence the need to 
formulate basic cost allocation principles that can be used to 
systematically compare the merits of different methods. 
Two principles seem very broadly applicable. One is the 
"core", which says that an allocation should provide sufficient 
incentive for every group of users to cooperate (provided such 
an allocation is possible); it can also be stated as the require- 
ment that no group should have to "subsidize" another in the use 
of the facilities (provided such an allocation is possible). The 
second principle, "monotonicity", says that no reasonable method 
would assess some user Zess if total costs were to go up; nor 
by the same token would it assess more if the costs were to go 
down. 
Six different approaches have been selected for comparison 
from among the various methodsdiscussed in the project evaluation 
and game theory literature, and their performance evaluated in 
relation to an actual municipal cost allocation problem in Sweden. 
The findings were as follows: 
The proportionaZ approach is seen at its greater advantage 
when the allocation criterion chosen (eg. allocation according 
to offical census populations) seems equitable, and gives numbers 
whose accuracy is not seriously disptable. It is also relatively 
easy to compute. The difficulty with this approach is that it 
ignores the alternative costs of the prospective partners, and 
hence may not provide sufficient incentives for them to cooperate. 
This possibility actually arose in the Swedish example. 
Of the methods using costs to determine allocations one of 
the most widely used in the separable cost remaining benefit 
(SCRB) method. But this method only considers the marginal costs 
of individual participants, not of groups. Hence, as seen in 
the Swedish example, one may have allocations that are not group 
rational, or in other words which subsidize sGme groups at the 
expense of others. In addition, this method is not monotone. 
A more sophisticated and widely used method from game theory 
is the Shapley value. This method is individual'ly rational and 
monotone but unfortunately - as shown by the Swedish example - 
may not be group rational. 
The three remaining methods - least core ( and nucleolus), 
proportional least core and weak least core - satisfy the core 
principle by definition. However, neither the least core (nor 
the nucleolus) nor the proportional least core need be monotone, 
though the latter only breaks down for a somewhat "special" class 
of examples. 
Thus only the weak least core satisfies both basic principles 
over the most general class of examples. The proportional least 
core also behaves satisfactorily over a fairly wide range of 
situations and might even be preferred from an equity standpoint 
in some cases. 
The conclusion is that a systematic investigation of methods 
in the light of what they do in practice shows significant differ- 
ences between them. While the decision about what principles 
should apply in a given situation must be left to the decision 
makers involved, such a choice has Ciefinite iaplications for what 
method should 5e used. 
APPENDIX 
Note 1 .  The following procedure is used to determine the sizes 
of pipes and pumps for water transmission to cope with the water 
requirements expected by the end of the period (the year 1980 in 
our case) which the system is designed to serve. 
The cost of water transmission includes the following 
components: 
B Cost of pipelines : C1 = clL = (y+CiD )L 
Cost of pumps : C2 = c2fP 
Cost of electricity: C3 = c3P 
where 
C, = unit cost of piping 
L = length of pipe 
c2 = unit cost of pump 
f = safety factor . .  
c3 = unit cost of electricity 
p = -  ' *  8 1  QH = effective capacity of pump 
E 
Q = flow of water in pipe 
H = Ho + I L = required pumping head 
Ho = difference in attitude between origin and 
destination of pipe 
I = hydraulic gradient 
E = pumping efficiency 
D = pipe diameter 
a,B,y = coefficients 
The total annual cost of transmission is given by 
Skr. 
Skr, 
Skr/yr . 
C = (C1+C2) CRF + C3 f 
where CRF = (1+iIn i 
n 
= capital recovery factor 
(l+i) -1 
i = interest rate 
n = amortization period in years 
The total cost C is a function of the pipe diameter D, the 
flow Q, the pumping head H, and the length of pipe L. These 
factors are related by the Hazen-Williams formula: 
where 
Cw = .Hazen-Williams coefficient. 
* 
The economical pipe diameter D is obtained as a function 
ac- : of the flow Q by lettering - - 
aD 
where 
9.81 
a = (c2f CRF +c3) - E 
Similarly, the economic hydraulic gradient I* is obtained as 
uf3 CRF @/4.87 I* = Q (1*858- 4.87)/(0+4.87) 4.87a 
The parameters are determined from Swedish data as follows: 
a = 477 Skr  , B = 1.60 , y = 150 Skr  
CRF = .0871 based on i = .06, n  = 20 y e a r s  
The r e s u l t s  a r e  g i v e n  below 
C1 = (150 + 477 D 
1.60 
L Skr . 
C 2  = 39.2 QH x  10 3 Skr .  
Note 2 .  S i n c e  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  what t o  c a l l  d i r e c t  c o s t s  may b e  
a r b i t r a r y ,  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o r  e x c l u s i o n  o f  such  c o s t s  shou ld  g i v e  
e q u i v a l e n t  r e s u l t s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  i f  ( d l , d 2 ,  ..., dn) a r e  d i r e c t  
c o s t s ,  t h e n  s u b t r a c t i n g  them from t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  c r e s u l t s  i n  
t h e  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  c '  d e f i n e d  by c '  (S)  = 
c (S)  - i d i  f o r  a l l  s u b s e t s  S  o f  N .  The a l l o c a t i o n  method i s  
s t r a t e g i c a l l y  i n v a r i a n t  i f  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  c '  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  
t o  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  f o r  c; t h a t  i s ,  ( x 1 , x 2 ,  ..., xn) i s  an  a l l o c a t i o n  
f o r  c i f  and o n l y  i f  ( x l  -dl ,x2-d2 , . . . ,xn-d,) i s  an a l l o c a t i o n  
f o r  c ' .  
I t  i s  easy  t o  check t h a t  t h e  Shapley v a l u e ,  l e a s t  c o r e ,  
n u c l e o l u s ,  and weak l e a s t  c o r e ,  a s  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  t e x t ,  a r e  s t r a -  
t e g i c a l l y  i n v a r i a n t .  So a l s o  i s  SCRB provided t h e  b e n e f i t  s i d e  
is  ignored  ( i .e .  prov ided  b e n e f i t s  a r e  always assumed t o  exceed 
i n d i v i d u a l  c o s t s ) .  The p r o p o r t i o n a l  l e a s t  c o r e  and t h e  propor-  
t i o n a l  methods a r e  n o t  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  i n v a r i a n t .  However, a  
s imple  d e v i c e  t o  remedy t h i s  problem is t o  f i r s t  n o r m a l i z e  t h e  
c o s t  f u n c t i o n  c by d e f i n i n g  c (s) = Cc (i) - c (S) , t h e n  app ly  t h e  
S 
- 
methods t o  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  c t o  o b t a i n  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  ( ~ l , . . . , x n ) .  
The a c t u a l  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  ( x , ,  ..., xn)  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
- 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o s t s  and t h e  zi : xi = c ( i )  - x  i 
Note 3. By definition the weak least core is the set of x 
- 
optimizing the linear program 
(11) min E 
subject to 
E X ~ L C ( S )  + E I S  for all S$N 
S 
This is equivalent to 
max C(N) - no = L(xi - E )  
N 
subject to 
which is equivalent to solving 
(1 2) max lyi 
N 
subject to 
and letting E = [c(N) -c*(N)l/n, x = y + Ee where e = (lf1,*..,1) 
- - - - 
and c* (N) = L Yi is the optimal value of (1 2) . In particular, 
+ N + + if c satisfies c (N) > c (N) and c+ (S) = c (S) for all S :N, then x 
- + + + is the weak least core of c if and only if x = x - [[c (N) - 
- - 
c(N)]/n]e is in the weak least core of c. Thus the weak least 
- 
core is monotone. 
Note 4. ' Assume that c (S) > 0 for all S. 
By definition the proportional least core is the set of x 
- 
optimizing 
min r 
subject to Exi = c (N) 
N 
Lx. < (l+r) c(S) for all S ~ N ,  
S 1 =  
This  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
max C ( N ) / ( ~ + ~ )  = Lxi/(1+r) 
N 
sub j e c t  t o  
which i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s o l v i n g  ( 1  2 )  and l e t t i n g  r = [c ( N ) / c *  ( N )  ] - 1 
and x  = ( l + r ) y ,  where c * ( N )  = y .  i s  t h e  op t imal  v a l u e  of ( 1 2 ) .  
... ... N 1 
Notice t h a t  c*(N) > 0 by v i r t u e  of t h e  hypothes i s  t h a t  c ( S )  > 0 
+ + f o r  a l l  S. With c  d e f i n e d  a s  i n  Note 3 ,  it fo l lows  t h a t  x i s  
... + 
i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  l e a s t  c o r e  of c i f  and on ly  i f  x = [ c ( N ) /  
... 
c + ( N )  ]x+  i s  i n  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  l e a s t  c o r e  of  c.  
... 
Note 5 .  To see how t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  l e a s t  c o r e  can f a i l  t o  be 
monotone, c o n s i d e r  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  example s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of 
Sec t ion  1 b u t  where m u n i c i p a l i t y  B owns a  l a k e  wi th  s u f f i c i e n t  
c a p a c i t y  t o  s e r v e  a l l  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  a t  low c o s t  compared t o  
t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  The c o s t  f u n c t i o n  might be  a s  fo l lows :  
Thus t h e  c o s t s  o f  supply a r e  reduced provided B i s  i nc luded .  
Inc lud ing  B has  a  marg ina l  va lue  o f  2.0 ( t . h a t  i s ,  B ' s  marginal  
c o s t  i s  -2.0) hence B might w e l l  be p a i d ,  r a t h e r  t han  pay,  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e ,  i . e .  B may be  a b l e  t o  se l l  i t s  water  t o  t h e  o t h e r s  
a t  some n e g o t i a t e d  p r i c e .  The c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n s  by t h e  f i v e  
" s t r a t e g i c "  methods a r e  g iven  i n  Table  9 (second row) .  Not ice  
* 
t h a t  B g e t s  a  c r e d i t  i n  every  case. Now i f  t o t a l  c o s t s  i n c r e a s e  
t o  7.0,  t hen  A and C ' s  marginal  c o s t s  i n c r e a s e  and B ' s  marginal  
va lue  dec reases  s o  one would expec t  A and C t o  be a s s e s s e d  more 
and B t o  be p a i d  less. But t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  l e a s t  c o r e  a c t u a l l y  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  amount p a i d  t o  B. Note t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  circum- 
s t a n c e  t h a t  a l l  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n s  of 7.0 a r e  t h e  same excep t  f o r  
t h e ,  Shapley va lue .  
* 
BY c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  procedures  would a s s e s s  
B p o s i t i v e  c o s t s .  
SCRB 
Shapley value 
Nucleolus 
Proportional 
Least Core 
Weak Least Core 
Table 9 
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